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Abstract
This paper discusses why public pensions have warranted so much interest of late,
focusing on their financing status and reform options. Many state pension plans are underfunded,
and while they can pay promised benefits for some years, there is also enormous cross-state
heterogeneity and several state pension plans will require substantial new revenue and/or benefit
cuts to bring them to long-term solvency. What remains to be seen is how the burden of returning
the plans to financial health will be borne, and how key stakeholders will implement reforms in
these systems if they are to return to viability before time runs out.
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Public Pension Pressures in the United States
Olivia S. Mitchell

Of late, public employee pension plans have received a great deal of scrutiny and media
attention. 1 One reason is that some in the private sector are experiencing “pension envy” on
learning that public pension benefits are often more generous than those paid to private sector
employees. For instance, benefits on average replace 56% of pay for employees with 30 years of
work in the public sector (66% if they are not covered by Social Security), versus 46% for
private defined benefit-covered workers (Clark, 2011). Another reason is that financial markets –
investors, rating agencies, and insurers – are devoting much more attention than ever before to
the financing demands of public sector pensions plans when considering whether a state may be
able to sustain, and surely to increase, efforts to borrow as a means of smoothing the deleterious
impact of the financial crisis (Fitch 2011; Moody’s 2011; S&P 2011). This chapter discusses
why public pensions have warranted so much interest of late, devoting particular attention to
their financing, funding status, recent developments, and reform options.
We show that many state pension plans will be able to pay promised benefits for some
time, but there is enormous cross-state heterogeneity. Several states will surely require
substantial new revenue soon or they will need to institute benefit cuts if they are to return their
plans to long-term solvency. 2 What remains to be seen is how the burden of returning the plans
to financial health will be borne, and how key stakeholders will implement reforms in these
systems, if they are to once again become viable before time runs out.

1

2

A Google search provided 65 million results in September of 2011.

For lack of space we do not take up solvency issues facing federal employee pensions nor the
national Social Security system; neither can we focus on municipal pension financing or public
employee retiree health insurance obligations. For analysis of these see Clark and Morrill (2010,
2011), McElhaney (2009), Mitchell and Anderson (2009), and Mitchell and Hustead (2000).
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A Brief Background on State Pension Plans
Public sector pensions in the United States cover approximately 20 million public
sector (non-federal) employees and around seven million retirees (Staman, 2011). The vast
majority of U.S. public pension plans are of the defined benefit (DB) variety, where retiree
payments are specified as a stream of periodic payments for life with the amounts based on
retirees’ salary and years of service. In contrast, most private-sector employees with pensions
have defined contribution (DC) plans; in these, contributions are specified as a percent of pay,
but no particular benefit payout is specified. 3
Labor market analysts are in agreement that pensions are one of many forms of deferred
compensation offered to enhance employers’ ability to recruit, incentivize, and eventually retire
employees. 4 The U.S. has had a rich tradition of offering pensions to public employees,
beginning with disability pensions for the militia during the Colonial period (Clark et al., 2003;
2009; 2011). Thereafter, the U.S. Continental Congress established disability programs for
members of the armed services during the Revolutionary era, which were later converted to oldage pension programs for veterans. In the mid-19th century, many U.S. cities provided benefits
for their superannuated teachers, firefighters, police officers, and other public personnel, as part
of a broad effort to reform civil service jobs and move them into a merit-based system rather
than one based on patronage (Clark et al., 2003). Most federal employees were covered by

3

For useful overviews of U.S. public pension plans see Mitchell (2000); Mitchell and Anderson
(2009), Mitchell et al. (2000), and Mitchell and Hustead (2000); more recent studies include Pew
Center (2010a, 2010b, 2011).
4
Pensions are also a useful way for employees to save retirement in a tax-qualified vehicle
(McGill et al., 2010).
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retirement pensions by 1930, though the federal approach to retirement provision has also
evolved over time (Hustead and Hustead, 2001).
The first U.S. state credited with establishing a state-wide retirement plan is
Massachusetts, which in 1922 began to cover general public employees (Craig, 2003).
Thereafter, several states moved to implement pensions (mostly defined benefit plans) in
response to the passage of the national Social Security Act in 1935 which explicitly excluded
public sector employees. In 1950, an amendment to that Act permitted governmental units to
enter Social Security; currently, public employees in seven states are still not included in the U.S.
Social Security system. 5

The Structure of Public Sector Defined Benefit Plans
Workers covered by DB pension promises receive compensation in the form of labor
earnings as well as claims to future streams of pension payments in retirement. Accordingly, an
employee accrues a future promise of benefits each year on the job, an accrual that constitutes a
liability of the pension plan. Generally retirement benefits are determined by a formula (often
collectively bargained), where payments rise with the worker’s salary level, age and/or time on
the job (tenure), retirement age, and perhaps other factors (Mitchell et al., 2000).
In the early 1900’s, few state pension plans were “funded” – few had accumulated assets
sufficient to back the benefits accrued by active workers (Craig 2003). Indeed, most early plans
were run on a “pay-as-you-go” model, where annual benefit payments were covered by annual
employee and employer contributions, as well as dedicated taxes (e.g. property tax levies or one5

States still not participating in Social Security include Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Nevada, and Ohio. Additionally some local government workers do not
participate including groups in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas
(Clark 2011). In 1983 the right to withdraw from Social Security was revoked.
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time asset sales; c.f. Civic Federation, 2007). Over time, however, states began to link pension
contribution levels to actuarial calculations, which meant that each participant’s expected future
pension payments would be calculated and – at least in principle – money would be set aside
each year to finance those future benefits. To the extent that contributions were also invested, the
pension fund’s accumulated investment earnings were also used to pay benefits. From this
perspective, then, the notion of a fully funded DB plan evolved: it was one that had, at any given
date, sufficient money to pay all accrued vested benefits. 6
The first states to thus structure their plans – sometimes referred to as “scientific” pension
plans in the 1920’s – were New Jersey, Ohio, and Vermont (Craig, 2003). A key rationale for
using these actuarial calculations was to ensure that sufficient funds would be set aside to pay
workers’ accrued benefits. In practice of course, full funding is inherently a moving target: future
benefit projections rely on assumptions about wage increases, labor turnover, mortality patterns,
inflation, and other factors, and asset returns are also not reliably forecasted. Accordingly, DB
plans must periodically adjust contributions and/or benefits so as to rectify funding shortages. 7

6

This refers to vested benefits; vesting occurs when the worker has earned a legal right to the
future benefit stream. In the corporate sector, this funding concept is called the termination or
shutdown liability, referring to the ability of a plan to pay all promised benefits even if the plan
sponsor were to shut down (PBGC, nd). The public sector has often used different accounting
and financial reporting standards (GASB, 2006).
7
Pension cost concepts to this end are described by Winklevoss (1993) among others. It must be
noted that not everyone favors 100% funding of public pensions. From a practical viewpoint, the
GAO (2008: 19) notes that funding at an 80 percent level might be sensible since “…it is
unlikely that public entities will go out of business or cease operations as can happen with
private sector employers, and state and local governments can spread the costs of unfunded
liabilities over a period of up to 30 years under current GASB standards. In addition…it can be
politically unwise for a plan to be overfunded; that is, to have a funded ratio over 100 percent.
The contributions made to funds with “excess” assets can become a target for lawmakers with
other priorities or for those wishing to increase retiree benefits.” Bohn (2011), among others,
offers theoretical arguments pro and con.
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Recent Concerns about State Pension Plans
A major debate has recently exploded regarding public sector pension problems, driven
in part by the ongoing economic recession which drastically cut state tax collections by 30
percent in 2009 (and revenue streams have not recovered quickly; c.f. Cooper 2011).
Consequently, many states face substantial budget challenges on many fronts due to
extraordinary unemployment insurance bills, rising Medicaid expenditures due to aging
populations, and the need to pay for major infrastructure improvements. Also, most state
governments must balance their operating budgets, making it difficult to come up with the
needed cash to remedy pension shortfalls at the same time that other pressing fiscal needs have
emerged. 8
These exigencies are now competing with the need to hike contributions to meet public
pension funding requirements. Such shortfalls were partly the result of the approximately $1
trillion in losses sustained by plan assets during the financial market implosion (Munnell et al.,
2011a). In addition, public sector employees have been retiring in record numbers, increasing
the drain on pension assets sooner than expected. 9 Public plans have also gotten into financial
trouble for longer-standing reasons, including the fact that states have historically cut pension
contributions and raised benefit promises in good economic times, rather than taking advantage
of robust periods to build up a financial cushion to protect against downturns (Schieber, 2011).

8

An active discussion is underway regarding the potential for state bankruptcy in the wake of the
crisis; c.f. Skeel (2011). Barclay’s (2011) noted that pension underfunding plays a role in this
process, since Standard & Poor’s downgraded New Jersey’s general obligation (GO) rating to
AA- from AA, citing its concern about the state’s pension system underfunding; they also
indicated that Moody’s expressed concern regarding Illinois state bonds due to pension funding
shortfalls.
9
For instance, retirement rates for Ohio public school teachers rose between 2009 and 2010 by
20 percent, and 50 percent for highway patrol officers, as workers responded to uncertainty about
the state’s pension underfunding (Rowl, 2011).
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Public plan contributions have also fallen short of what they should have been: for instance,
according to Greenhouse (2011), the 50 states together owed $117 billion to their pension plans
in 2009 but in fact only contributed $73 billion. Contribution shortfalls of this nature have
persisted because state DB plans follow rules set by their legislatures rather than by a centralized
accounting authority; this permits politicians to adjust payment targets in times of fiscal
stringency. 10
Public pensions have also been roundly critiqued of late regarding how they measure
their assets and liabilities. On the asset side, rather than reporting the market value or the
amount for which the assets could be sold in the capital market, public DB pensions are
permitted to “smooth” the time period over which the valuation is conducted (most public plans
smooth assets over five or more years; Barclays, 2011). While such smoothing does reduce
reported plan funding volatility, it also means that, after a substantial market crash such as the
recent one, reported asset values and returns do not portray a plan’s economic funding status as
of any given moment. For instance, at year-end 2009, the 50-state total of assets computed using
actuarial values exceeded the assets’ market value by over 20% (Barclay’s 2011).
Another thorny issue has to do with how the public pension plan liabilities are measured.
This is difficult, because DB plan liabilities are of very long duration – they include the sum of
benefits that must be paid this year, next year, the year afterward, and so forth, until the last
surviving pension plan participant dies. If we define B t as the retirement benefits a DB plan is

10

The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) requires public sector employers to
report annual required contribution (ARC) amounts, but as Barclay’s (2011: 44) notes, this “is
not a government funding requirement…. While the ARC prescribes what an employer should
contribute to cover current (normal) costs incurred and pay down the UAAL [unfunded
liabilities], actual contributions do not always equal the ARC because governments are free to
determine their own funding schedules. In addition, during times of fiscal stress, states may
choose to defer or cut their pension contributions.” (italicized phrase added).
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obligated pay to all retirees in any given year t; r the discount rate used to convert current future
benefits into today’s dollars; and assuming that last possible year the final plan survivor
(including spouses) will die is 90 years from now, then the expected present value of the benefit
stream may be expressed as follows: 11
EPV Benefits = B 0 + B 1 /(1+r) + B 2 /(1+r)2 … + B 90 /(1+ r)90
Naturally, many assumptions are required to forecast future DB plan obligations, including wage
growth and inflation, turnover and retirement patterns, mortality improvements, and so forth. 12
Yet an underappreciated and very powerful factor driving the liability measure is r, the discount
rate. For corporate pensions, the U.S. government requires private DB plans to use discount
rates consistent with the cost of corporate borrowing (the corporate yield curve). By contrast,
public pension accounting permits DB plans to discount future benefit promises at the projected
rate of return expected on plan assets, rather than what it would cost the state to borrow. What
this means is that public DB plan sponsors today regularly use discount rates higher than eight
percent, despite the fact that they will probably not earn long-term asset returns of this magnitude
anytime soon. 13
As is evident from the formula above, when a DB plan sponsor selects a high discount
rate for computing funding levels, this mechanically lowers plan measured liabilities. What
might be less obvious is that seemingly small changes in r have profound implications for
pension funding and contribution requirements. For instance, Winklevoss (1993) noted that a
11

We refer the interested reader to McGill et al. (2010) for a more detailed discussion of plan
cost methods.
12
Another issue worth mentioning here is that public plan liabilities often are broader than
corporate pension liabilities, in that the former include future or projected benefits as well as
accrued vested benefits earned as a function of salary and service to date.
13
Wilshire (2011) expects the median state pension fund to earn 6.5% per year on its
investments, assuming asset allocations of 64% equity (31% US, 18% non-US, 6% real estate,
and 9% private equity), and 36% fixed income (27% US, 9% other) .

8

single percentage point increase in the discount rate shrinks measured plan actuarial liabilities by
15-20 percent; Munnell et al. (2011a, b) shows that raising the discount rate by two percentage
points, from 8 to 10 percent, staves off the date at which a public plan will exhaust its assets –
and hence be unable to pay benefits – by a dozen years. In other words, selecting a high discount
rate will mean substantially lower pension liabilities – implying, in turn, lower contributions
required to finance retiree promises. 14
To illustrate the stakes in this highly-charged debate, Table 1 reports how state DB plan
funding projections respond to different discount rate assumptions. In the left-most column,
liabilities are $2.8 trillion when discount rates chosen by the states (usually 8%) are used. The
middle column uses the taxable municipal bond yield curve, and here liabilities are larger, at
115% of commonly-reported levels. The final column, where a Treasury bond yield curve is
used, pegs state pension liabilities at 185% of the first column (Rauh, 2010). Clearly, the choice
of discount rate makes an enormous difference in measuring the size of benefits promised to
retired workers. After subtracting out plan-reported asset levels, the net underfunding also varies
rather dramatically: in the first column, underfunding using state discount rates amounts to
$0.86 trillion; in the second column, the estimate is half again as large with the muni-bond rate;
and using Treasury rates boosts public pension underfunding to $3.26 trillion. 15 In other words,
using the state-selected discount rates, the ratio of state pension assets to liabilities (A/L) comes
to 69%, indicating an estimated shortfall of almost one-third overall. But the A/L ratio is only

14

For instance, when New York State raised its assumed interest rate in 1991 from 8 to 8.75
percent, this lowered the government’s annual required contribution by $325 million (Hsin and
Mitchell, 1994).
15
This pattern is similar to those reported by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (Russek,
2011) and Munnell et al. (2011).
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37% using the least risky rate, implying that assets fall short of promised benefits by almost twothirds.
Table 1 here
The economic rationale for using a less-risky discount rate is that public pension benefits
are often deemed to be very secure promises. In fact they are frequently guaranteed by state
constitutions and backed by the full faith and credit of the state tax base (Staman, 2011; NEA
2004). 16 For this reason, financial economists argue that the discount rate for valuing future
public pension benefits should be close to a risk-free Treasury rate (Brown and Wilcox, 2009;
Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011a). Furthermore, conformity with private pension accounting would
suggest that a state’s borrowing rate is a better assumption than the (usually much higher)
expected return on assets. Also, from the perspective of transparency, Wilcox (2008: 1) contends
that “[s]ome have argued that because state and local governments do not exist to generate a
profit, or because public plan sponsors cannot go out of business or be acquired by a competitor,
market-based estimates are irrelevant for them. Others have argued that policymakers need other
information aside from market-based estimates in order to make sound decisions on behalf of
their constituents… [But] in order to be useful, an estimate of plan liabilities must provide an
analytically sound answer to a coherent, well-specified question. Market-based estimates of plan
liabilities meet that test.”
On the other hand, some actuaries and plan administrators continue to argue strongly in
favor of the conventional approach. One reason is that it is believed to generate more stable
16

The Little Hoover Commission noted that (2011: i): “[p]ension benefits promised to retirees are
irrevocable, as are the promised benefits that current workers have accrued since their
employment began. It also remains difficult to alter the theoretical, yet-to-be earned benefits for
current workers. This situation, reinforced by decades of legal precedent, leaves little room for
state and local governments to control mounting retirement costs, particularly when the only
venue for change is the bargaining table.”

10

contribution rates than the alternative (Segal, 2011). 17 Another reason, according to Miller
(2008: 2) is that “[b]y retaining the traditional practice of using reasonably probable investment
returns as the basis for discounting future obligations… actuaries and accountants faithfully
support the primary purpose of a public pension plan -- which is to establish a funding plan that
has the best possible chance of equitably balancing the interests of today’s taxpayers and
tomorrow’s retirees. Many … would agree with me that using risk-free rates of return to value
public plans (which enjoy a long-term horizon and capacity to prudently assume equity risks)
will almost assuredly over-burden today’s taxpayers. Such an MVL regime would perversely
shift the entire normal market risk premium to the benefit of future generations at the expense of
their forebears.” 18
But change is in the wind. Several states are currently litigating cases that would allow
legislatures to alter and amend pension benefit and contribution formulas; these may render
public pension promises less immutable than anticipated in the past. 19 New rules are also being
developed by the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB 2011) which will use a bond
discount rate for underfunded pension liabilities (though expected asset returns will still be used
to value funded plan liabilities; Segal 2011).

Meanwhile, though two of the major rating

agencies, Standard & Poors and Moody’s, are still using reported funding ratios using state-

17

See also Angelo et al. (2010); Lav and McNichol (2011); and SOA (2006).
Maurer et al. (2009) develop an explicit model to examine what asset allocation would
minimize worst-case pension costs using a Monte Carlo framework and a stochastic present
value approach, combined with a conditional value at risk measure. They show that funding
public pension obligations requires being explicit about the level of risk that the plan fiduciary is
willing to take on, which in turn requires explicit attention to risk-bearing by present and future
generations.
19
For a discussion of litigation underway on public plan benefit changes see Barclays (2011)
and Snell (2011). Walsh (2011) reports that judges in Colorado and Minnesota have refused to
hear complaints about reductions in the cost-of-living adjustments for public pension recipients.
For a discussion of other reforms see Brown et al. (2011).
18
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determined discount rates, Fitch is moving toward more conservative rates to make plan funding
rates comparable across states (Barclays, 2011; Fitch, 2011; Moody’s, 2011). It is also evident
that public pension discount rate choices have been selected opportunistically: for instance, states
experiencing fiscal problems reduce required contribution flows by selecting higher pension
discount rates (Hsin and Mitchell, 1994), and less well-funded plans are more than 2.5 times
more likely to use a discount rate greater than eight percent, compared to better funded plans
(Park, 2009). While the great discount rate debate is far from over, it seems probable that the
economic perspective will eventually prevail.

How Important Is This?
The debate over exactly which public pension underfunding measure to use ultimately
boils down to what these shortfalls mean to stakeholders, and which stakeholders will be most
affected when pension promises made to teachers, police, firefighters, and other state employees
cannot be met. In the past, state pension contributions averaged 4% of annual state budgets, a
level low enough that some argue there is little need for concern (Munnell et al. 2010). But this
logic is flawed, since the historical experience does not reflect the large new financing shortfalls
resulting from the financial crisis, recession, and other longer-term problems. For example
Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011a) estimate that contributions to public pensions will need to rise
more than three-fold, to 14% of public sector revenue, to achieve full funding over the next 30
years. Average contributions would have to rise to 41% of payroll, and on average this could
amount to a per-household average tax increase of $1,400 per year.
Of course attempting to raise taxes this much could have potentially very serious
consequences. Some public sector entities are already finding it difficult to borrow in the capital

12

market as a result of the economic and financial crisis, and rating agencies are now paying much
closer attention to whether pension shortfalls are exacerbating this problem. Explicit state debt
totaled $2.4 trillion in 2010 (Mcguire 2011: 5), and many states face limited capacity to borrow
further. It is also worth noting that the pension financing burden is not spread evenly. For
instance, more than 20% of all general state transfers and revenues received by the State of
Illinois are currently required to pay for pensions (Barclays 2011: 1). 20 To amortize their
shortfalls over the next 30 years, New Jersey and New York households would face immediate
and continuing tax hikes of more than $2,200 per household. California and Illinois residents
would confront a yearly tax increase of over $1,900; while at the low end, Indiana residents
would need to pay only $329 more per year in order to fund state pensions over the next three
decades (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011c: 40). Many municipalities and even some states are also
aware that raising taxes may shrink the tax base. 21
If needed revenues are not raised, however, a large number of public plans is likely to run
quite short on cash within the decade. Munnell et al. (2011a) estimate the exhaustion date for
public plans under two scenarios, an “ongoing” framework assuming that plan sponsors pay the
full costs required in future years, versus a “termination” framework assuming that benefit
payments must rely solely on existing assets. If a relatively high 6% discount rate is assumed
(yet one below what most plans currently use), they predict that public plans will exhaust their
assets in 2022 on average if they terminated immediately and paid only already-accrued benefits.
The exhaustion year is pushed back – but only slightly – to 2025, assuming that new
contributions continue to flow in and benefit accruals continue to rise. Either way, these dates are

20

This figure includes pension benefits and debt service on pension obligation bonds.
For instance Epple and Shipper (1981) report that a large component of public pension
shortfalls is capitalized in property prices.
21

13

alarming, particularly for Baby Boomers expecting a pension cashflow for two to three decades
in retirement. It is also striking that the exhaustion date forecasts are quite unresponsive to higher
discount rates.
Table 2 here
There is also substantial variation around the averages, as illustrated in Figure 1. Here the
projected dates of exhaustion for public pensions in Illinois, Indiana, Connecticut, and New
Jersey will take place by 2020, along with Hawaii, Louisiana and Oklahoma. A dozen more
states face cash strictures by 2025, with about the same number by 2030. States projected to be
in better shape include Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New York, and North Carolina. It should be
noted that these projections assume that investments return 8% per year; moreover, the analysis
does not take into account reforms already made as well as potential future changes (Angelo et
al. 2010). But as we shall see, the reforms currently underway may not do much to remedy the
problems at least for those facing most serious shortfalls.
Figure 1 here

Reforms Underway
In response to the fiscal pressures identified above, several public plan sponsors have
proposed and implemented reforms that they hope will alleviate these pension pressures. As
noted by the GAO (2011), one rather worrisome approach has been to tilt pension portfolios into
riskier investments, in the hope of making higher expected returns. For instance, New Jersey’s
public pension council recently approved a one-third increase in the maximum permitted
allocation to alternative investments including hedge funds and private equity (Tangel, 2011);
Illinois and Pennsylvania’s funds have been writing credit default swaps and international

14

interest rate swaps (Harris 2010). Some states have also issued special pension obligation bonds
(POBs) to generate cash which is then deposited in the pension system; nevertheless, this has
proven an expensive way for some states to raise money. 22 Even when these are admissible
assets for pension plans, they also involve substantially more risk, and given extant
underfunding, it is unclear if such investments are consistent with a well-thought out approach to
pension risk management. 23
An increasingly prevalent way to raise plan revenue involves asking employees to pay
more for their own pensions. In 2010, a dozen states boosted employee pension contributions; to
date in 2011, 14 states including Wisconsin and Florida have also legislated contribution
increases (Greenhouse, 2011). 24 The governor of New York in 2011 has requested a doubling of
employee contribution rates from three to six percent of pay; in Oregon, the proposed hike is
from zero to six percent.
Besides boosting investment returns and raising contributions, the only other way to
reduce pension underfunding is to curtail expenditures. Of late, many such efforts have been set
in motion (NASRA, nd). Changing the rules for retirees is usually seen as most difficult, though
changes in cost-of-living adjustments clearly reduce the purchasing power of retiree benefits. 25
Altering prospective benefits for existing workers is also difficult, since many state statutes and
constitutions protect not only accrued but also prospective benefits for current employees. Also,

22

Barclay’s (2011) reports that, if states were to issue $700 B in 30-year debt at an interest rate
of 6-7.5% to finance their public plans, annual debt service would amount to about 7-8% of state
tax revenues.
23
In fact, some financial economists and actuaries have recommended otherwise (c.f. Black,
1989; Gold and Latter, 2009; Lucas and Zeldes, 2009; and Peskin, 2001; among others).
24
For a detailed list of changes in 2011 to date, see Snell (2011).
25
As noted above, Colorado, Minnesota, and South Dakota have recently sought to restrict costof-living adjustments (COLA); a full list of 2011 COLA changes appears in Snell (2011) and
NASRA (nd).
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current employees are usually covered by collective bargaining contracts which require joint
union/management agreement to bring about any change. For these reasons, it has been
somewhat less difficult (and less controversial) to adjust benefit formulas for future employees –
those not yet hired. For instance, numerous states have raised the number of years required to
vest in (gain a legal entitlement to) eventual benefits; in addition, the retirement age has been
raised in several cases, along with the number of years required for unreduced benefits (Snell,
2011).
Some have proposed switching from a DB to a DC plan to reduce future benefit costs. To
date, two states, Alaska and Michigan, have mandated DC plans for new hires; ten additional
states offer as options either defined contribution or hybrid plans (mixed DB and DC). It is worth
noting, however, that reducing costs for the not-yet-hired would not be expected to affect the
already accrued benefits – also known as the legacy benefits – and their underfunding inherited
from the past. 26
At the end of the day, the size of the public pension shortfall remains dauntingly large
and discouragingly expensive to fix. And few of the changes explored to date will help fill the
gap very much, including changes in the cost-of-living escalators (COLAs) often applied to
benefits post-retirement. According to Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011a: ii) a “one percentage point
reduction in COLAs would reduce total liabilities by 9-11%, implementing actuarially fair early
retirement could reduce them by 2-5%, and raising the retirement age by one year would reduce
them by 2-4%. Even relatively dramatic policy changes, such as the elimination of COLAs or the
implementation of Social Security retirement age parameters, would leave liabilities around $1.5

26

Bergen and Garcia (2011) indicate that the SEC has been exploring how the state of Illinois
has been able to argue that benefit reductions applying only to new hires can be described in a
state bond offering as reducing pension contributions immediately and through 2045.
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trillion more than plan assets under Treasury discounting. This suggests that taxpayers will bear
the lion's share of the costs associated with the legacy liabilities of state DB pension plans.”

Conclusions
This brief overview has argued that the recent financial and economic crises have
exacerbated the breadth and depth of pension financing challenges by undermining state revenue
collections, wounding pension investment performance, and spiking pension liabilities. Fewer
active workers remain to support retirees than ever before, and even if equity returns did rise
strongly and persistently, it is unlikely that this will happen soon enough to cure the most
seriously-challenged plans. Yet it is worth remembering that many state pension problems arose
for deeper reasons including the lack of public pension transparency, overreliance on risky asset
returns to measure pension liabilities, and inability to meet contribution requirements on a
regular basis. As a result, too many U.S. state pension systems have become underfunded, and
several face enormous challenges in the not-too-distant future if they are to return to solvency.
As a result of the recent ‘perfect storm,’ what was once seen as a safe defined benefit
promise has now been transformed into a much riskier retirement offering. U.S. state pensions
are not guaranteed by federal backing, so it is possible that a public plan might even be unable to
continue paying promised benefits. Though modern U.S. history offers no examples of state
bankruptcies to date, some municipalities have had to renegotiate their obligations in recent
decades. 27 This in turn raises questions about how public pensions are governed, and whether the
existing structures are capable of ensuring managerial oversight of operations and accountability.
Pension trustees are the designated ‘holders of the pension purse strings,’ faced with the difficult
27

These include Cleveland, Ohio; Bridgeport, Connecticut; and Vallejo, California (c.f.
Barclays, 2011).
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challenge of balancing the often-conflicting interests of public sector active and retired workers,
taxpayers, and consumers. 28 Those seeking to remake and strengthen public pensions will need
to return the plans to affordability, while making them more resilient to financial, economic,
demographic, and political pressures.

28

For further discussion of public plan governance see Useem and Mitchell (2000) and Yang and
Mitchell (2008).
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Table 1. Present Value of Aggregate State DB Plan Liabilities, Alternative Scenarios
Assumed Discount Rate
a

State-Chosen
(1)   Total Plan Liabilities* $2.80 trillion
(2)   Total Plan Assets ** $1.94 trillion
Difference (1-2)
$0.86 trillion
Notes:

b

Taxable Muni
$3.21 trillion
$1.94 trillion
$1.27 trillion

Treasuryc
$5.20 trillion
$1.94 trillion
$3.26 trillion

* Plan liabilities measured using the Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) accrual
methodology; see Rauh (2010).
**Assets estimated as of 12/08
a
Benefits discounted at the state-chosen discount rate, usually 8%.
b
Benefits discounted at municipal bond rates based on zero-coupon municipal yield curve as of
1/30/99.
c
Benefits discounted at the zero-coupon Treasury yield curve as an approximation for a defaultfree rate.
Source: Rauh (2010) Table 1.

Table 2. Year of Public Plan Exhaustion for Alternative Asset Returns, under Ongoing and
Termination Scenarios
Assumed Return on
Assets
6%
8%
10%

Ongoing

Termination

2025
2029
2035

Notes: See text for definitions.
Source: Munnell et al. (2011a) Table 4

2022
2025
2029

25

Figure 1. Anticipated Year of Exhaustion for State Pension Fund Assets

Note: Projections assume the funds earn 8% on assets and all future contributions are used to pay for new benefits in
full. Source: Derived from Rauh (2010: Table 1)

